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In many rural settings, informal mutual support networks have evolved into
semiformal insurance groups, such as funeral societies. Using detailed panel
data for six villages in Ethiopia, we can distinguish two types of contracts, in
terms of whether payments are only made at the time of death or savings are
accumulated by the group based on premiums paid ex-ante. We characterize
these contracts as the coalition-proof equilibria of a symmetric and stationary
risk-sharing game, and we show numerically that a contract with savings makes
higher demands on enforceability, leading to less cohesive groups ﬁnding it
in their interest to choose the contract without savings and that coalition-
proofness is a necessary condition for the coexistence of both contract types.
We show in the data that the type of contract chosen by groups is correlated
with the level of trust and other enforcement improving factors. We also predict
that among the observed contracts, those with group-based savings and ex-ante
payments will attain higher welfare in terms of consumption smoothing than
those observed using no group savings. Using panel data, and controlling for
household ﬁxed eﬀects and time-varying village level ﬁxed eﬀects, we show
that funeral groups are vehicles for risk-sharing and that contract type matters
for performance in line with these predictions. The results appear robust to
endogeneity of group formation and endogenous selection into contract types.
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CSAE WPS/2009-041 Introduction
In the absence of complete markets in developing countries, a host of economic ac-
tivities are carried out by informal groups. These range from labour-sharing and
share cropping arrangements to credit and savings associations and even include
local insurance clubs that oﬀer protection against a variety of shocks. While these
groups diﬀer substantially in their degree of formalization, they all have in common
that they cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms to induce members to
comply with their obligations (Ligon et al. (2002), Anderson et al. (2008)). Instead,
the only incentive for cooperation is usually provided by the expected gain from
continued participation in the arrangement in the future and groups often resort to
complex contractual designs and implicit enforcement mechanisms to make this gain
from cooperation – or conversely the cost of noncompliance – as large as possible.
Although these informal economic arrangements are ubiquitous in the developing
world, relatively little – beyond the anecdotal – is known about their institutional
design especially in relation to its impact on members’ welfare. Understanding the
contractual design of informal economic groups, their ability to use implicit enforce-
ment mechanisms and the beneﬁts they provide to their members is particularly
important in assessing the scope for scaling up and extending these groups into
more formal institutions. In this paper, we examine a particular type of informal
arrangement - insurance groups. More speciﬁcally, we model the contractual design
of funeral insurance groups both theoretically and empirically based on a unique
survey of 78 funeral insurance groups in rural Ethiopia. In particular, we focus on
how contract design is used to increase the beneﬁts from risk-sharing by alleviating
enforcement issues.
Coate and Ravallion (1993) were the ﬁrst authors to model informal insurance
under the requirement that contracts have to be self-enforcing. They focus on a
symmetric and stationary 2-player game that allows for sharing risk across agents
in a given period, but not for smoothing across time. It is well known, that if the
ﬁrst-best equal-sharing contract is enforceable, then the ratio of marginal utilities is
constant across agents and consumption is equalized in every period. However, in
the absence of courts, the contract must be designed so that at every point in time,
the beneﬁt from sharing risk and remaining in the contract outweighs the beneﬁt
from defection and these additional constraints imply that the ﬁrst-best contract is
in general not sustainable.
There is a large literature that examines how the equilibrium of this risk-sharing
game can be improved upon by extending the contract space. Both Kocherlakota
(1996) and Ligon et al. (2002) have pointed out that conditioning on the previous
history of the game can improve the beneﬁts from risk-sharing that can be sustained
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takes on the form of quasi-credit contracts in which agents are induced to share
more of their income in the current period by promises of at least partial repayment
in the future. That is, an agent who shares his good fortune now will receive a
higher expected surplus from the arrangement in the future. Gauthier et al. (1997)
also allow for history dependence and extend the contract space to examine the role
of ex-ante transfers in improving the beneﬁts from risk-sharing in the self-enforcing
contract. The authors demonstrate that ex-ante payments can be used to relax
enforcement constraints and that an agent’s constrained eﬃcient ex-ante payment
is decreasing in the expected surplus he expects from the arrangement. In other
words, the more likely that an agent will want to deviate from the arrangement, the
higher will be his ex-ante payment. They show that these payments can be explicitly
linked to contract enforcement by interpreting them as a state-independent penalty
that is decided upon by the agents at the beginning of the period, is paid only in
the case of deviation and is enforceable by courts.
Finally, Gobert and Poitevin (1998) and Ligon et al. (2000) examine how the
opportunity for storage aﬀects the beneﬁts from risk-sharing. Of course, under full
commitment when the ﬁrst-best contract is enforceable, such a contract is clearly
superior because it allows for the smoothing of consumption both across time and
across space. However, as shown in Ligon et al. (2000) the eﬀect of savings is am-
biguous when contracts have to be self-enforcing. On the one hand, the opportunity
to save allows members of an insurance group to smooth aggregate shocks; on the
other hand the ability to self-insure increases the beneﬁts from deviation and this
crowds out mutual insurance over time.
An important caveat of the above literature is that risk-sharing arrangements are
deemed to be self-enforcing if they are stable with respect to individual deviations.
As pointed out by Genicot and Ray (2003), under this assumption any risk-sharing
arrangement would comprise the whole community and we can only explain the
plethora of small groups found in practice by exogenously imposing a limit on group
size. The authors resolve this paradox by pointing out that individuals deviations are
not the only threat to the stability of an insurance group. If large groups can form
and exploit the beneﬁts from risk-sharing, then there is no reason to rule out that
smaller groups can do the same and in turn destabilize larger groups by threatening
to deviate from them. In other words, it seems intuitive to require insurance groups
to be coalition-proof and this endogenizes the size of these groups Bernheim et al.
(1987).
There are only a few papers that have applied contract theory to understand in
detail the design of informal groups. Banerjee et al. (1994) study the design of 19th
century credit cooperatives. Cabrales et al. (2003) use mechanism design to analyze
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(2008) examine how the organizational structure of Kenyan urban Roscas can be
designed so as to address enforcement issues. Similar in spirit to Anderson et al.,
we compare insurance groups that appear to use diﬀerent contracts in the context
of semi-formal indigenous associations for the provision of funeral insurance in rural
Ethiopia. We present a theoretical model that incorporates diﬀerent institutional
features, in terms of the possibility of ex-ante payments and savings. We focus on
self-enforcing agreements, and model a new class of contract by extending Gauthier
et al. (1997) and Ligon et al. (2000) that does not just allows for ex-ante payments
and savings, but is also required to be coalition-proof. To our knowledge, this is
the only paper that relates an analysis of institutional design of insurance to welfare
outcomes at the level of individual participants in the insurance groups.
We derive a number of key predictions from the model. Under the ﬁrst best
risk-sharing arrangement, contracts allowing for savings are pareto superior to those
without savings. Agents will also be indiﬀerent between contracts allowing for ex-
post or ex-ante payments. We would predict to only observe groups with savings,
but both groups with ex-post and ex-ante payments would co-exist with indiﬀer-
ent performance in terms of consumption smoothing. However, these predictions
change when contracts have to be self-enforcing and coalition proof. In particular,
not all groups would engage in savings. As in Gauthier et al. (1997), the maximal
total ex-ante transfer can be viewed as the total penalty that could be extracted in
case of deviations from the contract. By implication, a group will be more cohe-
sive, the higher this total transfer. But high transfers may not be feasible, simply
because they cannot be paid for given agents’ resources. If this is the case, then
our simulations suggest that groups with no savings may be preferred to groups
with savings and low ex-ante transfers. Those groups whose constrained eﬃcient
contract includes savings would nevertheless perform better than those ﬁnding no
savings optimal, in terms of welfare via improved consumption smoothing.
The analysis leads to relevant empirical predictions. First, only if the extent of
risk-sharing is limited by the threat of coalitional deviations, would we expect to
observe heterogeneity in contracts. Thus the requirement of coalition-proofness is
not just appealing because it allows for the endogeneity of group formation, but also
because it is a necessary requirement for both group types to coexist in equilibrium.
In that case, observed groups with savings would outperform groups without savings
in terms of consumption smoothing. Furthermore, selection into contracts would be
governed by the maximal transfer that is feasible in the group, whereby this maximal
transfer is a measure of group cohesion. These transfers were modelled largely as if
they were a ﬁnancial transfer, but we show that it could either be a monetary transfer
or a credible threat to a social sanction. As a result, it follows that, ceteris paribus,
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higher social cohesion (such as in the form of trust or other social connectedness).
If the ability to save more is also related to issues of trust (avoiding embezzlement),
then this prediction is even stronger.
As our welfare predictions relate to the extent of consumption smoothing and
risk-sharing that diﬀerent contracts may attain, we can nest our paper directly into
the existing literature. A vast literature has studied the strategies households use
to smooth consumption in the face of large income ﬂuctuations and unforeseeable
expenditure needs (see Morduch (1999), and and Deaton (1997) for surveys). A
particular strand of this literature has focussed on testing whether rural communi-
ties manage to replicate Arrow-Debreu economies by employing these risk-coping
strategies and achieve full risk-sharing in the absence of complete markets (Deaton
(1992), Townsend (1994), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Udry (1994), Ligon et al.
(2002)). Although there is ample evidence that available risk-coping mechanisms
serve to provide at least partial insurance at the village level, the hypothesis of full
insurance is overwhelmingly rejected (Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Udry (1994),
Ligon et al. (2002), Gertler and Gruber (2002)).
Finding partial insurance at the village level has led to a literature exploring
risk-sharing at the level of groups or networks. For example, Grimard (1997) studies
risk-sharing among ethnic groups in Cote d’Ivoire; Morduch (1991) tests insurance
within castes in the ICRISAT data; and Dercon and Krishnan (2000a) ﬁnd some
evidence of full risk-sharing within nuclear households in Ethiopia. While risk-
sharing may be incidental to the above groupings, more recently much work has been
undertaken to map relevant insurance networks by asking households to identify
insurance partners they rely on in times of need (Fafchamps and Lund (2003), De
Weerdt (2004)). From these mapping exercises it has emerged that individuals in
rural communities are connected in insurance networks with a complex structure
of direct and indirect links. De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) have used such network
data for rural Tanzania to test for full insurance through networks by applying the
risk-sharing test to groups of directly linked households. Overall, the majority of the
above papers continue to reject full insurance but ﬁnd some evidence that subgroups
within the village play a role in consumption smoothing.
Our contribution diﬀers from those examined in the empirical literature so far in
important respects, by its focus on diﬀerent institutional designs in the context of
indigenous associations to cope with risk. Firstly, in contrast to insurance networks
which are the result of mainly informal bilateral relationships, funeral associations
- known as Iddir in Ethiopia - are large and sophisticated institutions, which are
formed with the speciﬁc purpose of oﬀering insurance for funeral expenses and in-
creasingly other forms of insurance and credit to cope with hardship. Iddir are
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and speciﬁc contributions and ﬁnes relevant to deviant behaviour (Dercon et al.
(2006)). Iddir are much larger than informal insurance networks, but still consid-
erably smaller than the community. Groups are also distinguished by the type of
contract they oﬀer. There are a large number of groups that demand regular (ex-
ante) contributions and accumulate substantial savings and these exist alongside
more informal associations that collect contributions only at the time of a funeral
(i.e. ex-post) and hold few if any savings; in other words, groups diﬀer in terms of
their institutional design.
Secondly, our approach is more structural in nature in the sense that our risk-
sharing test is based on a linear approximation of the analytical Euler equation that
describes equilibrium consumption in our model of contract design under imperfect
enforcement. As such we are estimating a model of incomplete insurance that nests
full insurance, but is readily interpretable when the full insurance hypothesis is
rejected. This approach is similar in spirit to Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), who
estimate a model partial insurance sustained by altruism and Ligon et al. (2002), who
estimate a full structural model of dynamic risk-sharing under limited commitment.
Our theoretical analysis makes predictions about the characteristics of the groups
choosing diﬀerent contracts, and has implications for the extent of risk-sharing ob-
tained by diﬀerent groups. In our econometric analysis, we combine household panel
data from rural Ethiopia with the data on funeral insurance groups to estimate the
determinants and welfare eﬀects of contract selection. Our ﬁndings are directly in
line with the theoretical predictions: we observe two types of contracts with groups
with more trust and social cohesion more likely to be engaged in contracts with
ex-ante payments and savings. Controlling for aggregate insurance group resources
and aggregate village resources, we examine whether households are able to smooth
consumption in the face of deaths of household members, the likely nature of the
enforcement problems they face and the role of diﬀerent contracts. We ﬁnd that,
at least on average, death shocks are well insured, but that this masks substan-
tial heterogeneity across contract types. The contract including savings delivers
full insurance, while those households who are insured in a contract with low ex-
ante payments and insigniﬁcant savings ﬁnd their consumption reduced signiﬁcantly
following a death shock. Moreover, the empirical results suggest that the beneﬁts
from risk-sharing are indeed limited by imperfect enforceability and more speciﬁcally
that coalitional deviations pose an important threat to the stability of risk-sharing
groups.
In Section 2, the survey data on funeral insurance groups are presented to mo-
tivate that analysis. Section 3 presents the theoretical model of contract structure,
ﬁrst focusing on the ﬁrst best in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, self-enforcing coalition
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presents simulations and Section 3.5 highlights the key empirical predictions. Sec-
tion 4 presents the empirical model including the econometric speciﬁcation for the
risk-sharing tests and the results from the empirical estimation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Funeral Insurance in Rural Ethiopia
The data are based on a sample of funeral societies and their members in six villages
in rural Ethiopia in 2003, Funeral Insurance Survey (FIS). In total, detailed data
has been collected on 78 funeral societies using interviews of its key members, and
the sample covered about half the number of those present in these villages. These
data were matched to household panel data, collected as part of the Ethiopian Rural
Household Survey, which has been conducted in these (and 9 other) villages since
1994. In each of the villages, the household survey is a random sample. We will
restrict our analysis to those households we could match, covering 301 households
with detailed information over time (6 rounds) and the funeral societies they belong
to.
Iddir are associations that ensure a payout in cash and in kind at the time of a
funeral for a deceased relative of a group member (for a detailed description of these
groups see Dercon et al. (2006)). These groups do not consist of loose and rapidly
changing associations of people. Instead, observed groups have been in existence for
an average of 18 years. Iddir have a stable and clearly deﬁned membership, usually
based on written lists, and payments are made when members incur costs related to
the funerals of a well-deﬁned set of relatives in their household. The actual payout
is conditional on the relationship of the member to the deceased: for example,
the payment for a spouse is typically diﬀerent from the payout for a child or for
uncles and aunts. The insurance groups have written statutes, bylaws and records
of contributions and payouts. The rules deﬁne membership procedures, payout
schedules, contributions and also a set of ﬁnes and other measures for nonpayment
of contributions.
Mortality rates are still very high in rural Ethiopia. In our sample, 45% of
households report at least one death of a household member in the survey period,
despite the fact the households are relatively nuclear (with an average household
size of 7.5 in the ﬁrst round). In each round of the data, on average 18% report a
death shock. Virtually all households in our sample - 96.5% - are members of at
least one Iddir. Just under 30% report belonging to one Iddir, 33% belong to two,
and another 33% belong to three or more. Each village contains at least a dozen
Iddir, but the number can rise as high as 30 or 40 Iddir in some communities. With
an average size of 85 members (households), these groups are signiﬁcantly smaller
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ﬁrst given the beneﬁts of large numbers for risk pooling, providing one motivation
for our interest.
A striking feature of these associations is their degree of formality and sophis-
tication. There are clear rules, an elected committee, and regular meetings. Iddir
are primarily designed for providing insurance in the case of funerals and payouts
are mainly made in cash but are also composed of in-kind gifts and labour services.
Table 1 oﬀers more details. The average payout per group including in-kind beneﬁts
is 201 Ethiopian Birr, which is about 1.2 times average monthly household income.
Average contributions are 1.51 Birr and groups retain substantial savings, which av-
erage 1921 Birr. The total insurance payouts made by Iddir in the past 12 months
average 1116 Birr.
Table 1: Characteristics of funeral insurance groups (mean and standard deviation).
all types No Savings Savings
Regular contribution to Iddir 1.51 0.27 2.35
(ETB/month equivalent) (1.41) (0.05) (1.38)
Contributions at funeral 1.32 3.67 0.13
(ETB) (1.73) (1.94) (0.08)
Payout in case of 201.80 143.69 277.00
member’s/spouse death (177.56) (127.15) (205.34)
Number of members 85 60 117
(99.34) (40.01) (138.14)
Current funds of Iddir (ETB) 1921.16 434.58 3488.08
(3968.58) (771.39) (5473.88)
Amount Iddir paid out in past 12 months (ETB) 1116.0 564.13 1952.70
(3749.58) (742.88) (6047.63)
Number of observations 78 41 37
Note: Diﬀerence in means statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level
for all Iddir characteristics.
Source: Funeral Insurance Survey.
Ethiopian Birr: 1 USD= 9ETB.
In the villages studied, and elsewhere in Ethiopia, there are two clearly distin-
guishable types of Iddir, which diﬀer in the extent to which the group uses savings
based on contributions. Members of one type of group make (pre-determined) con-
tributions when a funeral occurs and payments are made directly to the member
who incurs the funeral expense at the time of the funeral. In contrast, the other type
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a communal Iddir fund. Members make a claim when a death occurs in their house-
hold and are then reimbursed directly out of the Iddir fund. In some cases, these
members also make very small additional contributions when they attend the fu-
neral. To put it another way, the second type of group collects contributions before
the state of the world is known and saves them, to make payments after the state
of the world is known. The ﬁrst type of group collects contributions only after the
state of the world is known, and they are immediately distributed to the members.
Hence the two contract types can be distinguished by their use of savings.
As can be seen from Table 1, contract structure has an eﬀect on the amount
of contributions collected, payouts and accumulated savings. The average monthly
contribution for the iddir with savings is 2.35 birr. In some cases, the ﬁrst type
of Iddir also collect a small regular contribution, but this is signiﬁcantly smaller at
just 0.27 Birr, usually meant for very speciﬁc spending related to the running of
Iddir. In contrast, the average contribution for this type of Iddir at a funeral is
3.67 Birr, while the second type of Iddir make relatively small direct contributions
of about 0.13 Birr at the time of the funeral. As a consequence of collecting regular
contributions, the second type of Iddir retain substantial savings. With an average
of 3488 Birr, current funds in these groups are almost nine times larger than in the
other fund. They also provide a signiﬁcantly higher payout at the time of a funeral.
Given the formalized nature of the insurance groups, it is also interesting to
summarize the procedures groups have in place to enforce payments. Both types
of groups waive contributions if a household is not able to pay its contributions in
a particular round, but they levy steep ﬁnes and threaten exclusion if households
refuse to pay and do not give a satisfactory reason for this. The membership of the
Iddir is remarkably stable and few people leave either voluntarily or are forced to do
so. Equally, reported incidences of existing group breaking up into smaller groups
are few and far between. Interestingly, in the Iddir with savings, members who leave
the group are entitled to a share of the groups savings which is calculated as total
assets at the beginning of the period divided by the number of group members.
Clearly, these groups are rather diﬀerent from each other. Each group is rep-
resented in each village surveyed, so it is of interest to explore why these diﬀerent
contract structures co-exist. One possible explanation for this diﬀerence in con-
tracts is of course simply that members of the two group types are quite diﬀerent.
However, comparing the members of the two contract types, there is no diﬀerence
in risk in terms of instances of illness and mortality.1
In the next two sections, a theoretical model is developed that examines the fea-
tures of each contract design with a particular focus on the combinations of savings
1Details available from authors on request.
9and ex-ante transfers and the fact that groups are of limited size. Combined with
simulations, we provide predictions on selection into the contract, and its welfare
consequences, both under ﬁrst best conditions and constrained eﬃcient self-enforcing
and coalition-proof contracts.
3 The Model
We now formally model the diﬀerent contract structures observed among informal
insurance groups as the coalition-proof equilibria of a stationary and symmetric risk-
sharing game with savings and ex-ante transfers. The game is set in an environment
in which income realizations and asset holdings are observable and veriﬁable. We
ﬁrst describe the general set-up of the contract. In the next subsection, we analyze
the ﬁrst-best case in which all contracts are fully enforceable as a benchmark and
then proceed to examine which contracts will emerge in an environment of limited
commitment in which contracts must be self-enforcing.
3.1 The Environment
Suppose that there is a community of N households. Each period t =1 ,2,...,∞, the
state of nature s is drawn from a ﬁnite set of states s ∈{ 1,2,....,S}. Each period t
is divided into three dates: t0, t1 and t2. The state of nature is realized at date t1,
and we will refer to t0 as the ex-ante date and t2 as the ex-post date.
All agent’s are inﬁnitely lived and risk-averse. An agent’s preferences over con-
sumption ci
s(t) are represented by an increasing and strictly concave utility function
u(ci
s(t)). All agents discount the future by the common discount factor β. In each
period t, agent i receives an income yi
s(t) which takes on two values: h with prob-
ability p and l with probability 1 − p. Income is independently and identically
distributed across agents and income realizations are observable.
Since all agents are risk-averse, they can proﬁtably enter into a risk-sharing
relationship by forming an insurance group of size n ≤ N. In addition, individuals
and insurance groups have access to a storage technology with interest rate r, where
r>0. Savings of individual i are denoted by ai
s(t). Total savings in a group of
size n are denoted by A(t)=
n
i=1 ai
s(t) and we impose the condition that A(t) ∈
[0,A]. Requiring A(t) to be larger than zero implies a no-borrowing constraint.
Putting a ceiling on A(t) ensures that we are maximizing over a compact set which
guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the maximum. For simplicity, we make
no distinction between individual and group savings. That is, we assume savings are
held at the group level upon joining an insurance group. Since individual income
takes on only one of two values, aggregate income in a group of size n follows
a binomial distribution with probability of k high incomes denoted by p(k,n)=
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k!(n−k)!)pk(1−p)n−k. Hence the relevant information about the state of nature s in
a risk-sharing group of size n is summarized by the number of agents with a high
income realization k.
In each period, an insurance contract for a group of size n speciﬁes the following
structure for transfers, consumption and savings in the arrangement:
1. At t0 each agents pays a positive ex-ante transfer B(t), which is identical across
individuals, into the group savings fund.
2. At date t2, ex-post transfers τi
k(t) and consumption and savings levels for each
agent, ci
k(t) and ai
k(t + 1) are chosen.
Consumption takes place at t2, when the state of nature is known and is deﬁned as
ci
k(t)=yi(t) − B − τi
k(t)+( 1+r)ai(t) − ai(t +1 )
To close the model, let
n
i=1 τi
k(t)=−nB. In addition, we impose the condition that
the maximum ex-ante transfer is contained in a compact and convex set, B ∈ [0,B]
to ensure that the problem is well-behaved. As we will see, the restriction that B ≥ 0
is without loss of generality in both the ﬁrst-best and the second-best environment.
This formulation nests two types of contracts
1. Type I: B =0 ,A =0⇒ no ex-ante transfers and no savings.
2. Type II: B ≥ 0,A>0 ⇒ ex-ante transfer and savings.
The contract in which A = 0 and B>0 is not feasible since the ex-ante transfers
are stored in the group savings fund at t0. In other words, the ability to save is a
necessary prerequisite for the use of ex-ante transfers.
3.2 The First-Best Contract
We ﬁrst examine the benchmark case in which all prescribed transfers are enforceable
and solve for the full commitment symmetric insurance contract in a group of size
n. Since there are only two states of nature, we can simplify the law of motion for
the state variable as
ah(t + 1) = (1 + r)ah(t)+h − B − τh
k (t) − ch
k(t) (1)




k (t)+B) − cl
k(t) (2)
(3)
where the superscripts h and l indicate the respective individual income realizations
and we have used the fact that kτh
k (t)+( n − k)τl
k(t)=−nB.
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future savings levels in period t+1 by maximizing a weighted sum of utilities subject
to the aggregate resource constraints. This amounts to maximizing the following
dynamic programme, with each agent’s Pareto weight set to 1
n:


















subject to the aggregate intertemporal resource constraints in period t and period





k(t)+( n − k)cl
k(t)+kah(t +1 )+( n − k)al(t +1 )≤




ηj(t +1 ) : jch
j(t +1 )+( n − j)cl
j(t +1 )+jah(t +2 )+( n − j)al(t +2 )≤
kh+( n − j)l +( 1+r)Ak(t +1 ) ∀k,j
χ1(t +1 ) : A(t +1 )≥ 0
χ2(t +1 ) : A(t +1 )≤ A
ν1(t):B(t) ≥ 0
ν2(t):B(t) ≤ B(t)
where the Lagrange multipliers η in each state and time period are scaled for con-
venience by the probability of this state occurring.
The ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution for consumption and savings
prescribe that
u (ch























































(h − l) − B. (8)
Hence, we can normalize ah(t)=al(t)= 1
nA(t) and ah(t+1)=al(t+1)= 1
nA(t+1)
for all i =1 ,...,n.
It follows from this that the optimal contract is stationary in the sense that
ch
k(t)=ch
k(t + q) and cl
k(t)=cl
k(t + q) (9)
and therefore
V (A(t)) = V (A(t + q))
whenever A(t)=A(t + q). That is, the Pareto optimal contract is stationary
conditional on the level of aggregate savings, where the state variable is governed
by the following law of motion
A(t + 1) = (1 + r)A(t)+kh+( n − k)l − (kch
k(t)+( n − k)cl
k(t)). (10)
Moreover, because we solve for the equal-sharing contract, the expected lifetime
utility from risk-sharing V (A(t)) is the same for all agents in each period. That is
V i(A(t)) = V (A(t)) for all i =1 ,...n.
To see how the optimal ex-post and ex-ante transfers are determined in the
ﬁrst-best contract, rewrite consumption as
ch














((1 + r)A(t) − A(t + 1)). (12)
Since consumption only depends on net transfers −B−τh
k and k
n−k(τh
k +B), it follows
immediately that the ex-ante transfer B is arbitrary. Similarly, the lower and upper
bound on the ex-ante transfers are irrelevant, because even when binding, it is always
possible to adjust the ex-post transfer so as to achieve the optimal allocation. In
other words, under full commitment, ex-ante transfers and ex-post transfers are
perfect substitutes in the optimal contract and groups that use ex-ante transfers









in the optimal ﬁrst-best contract.
To examine the eﬀect of savings on welfare, we note that B(t) and A(t) are both
contained in compact and convex sets. It follows then from the assumptions on the
























= χ2(t +1 )> 0. (16)
That is, the the payoﬀ from being in a risk-sharing group of size n is increasing in
the group’s capital holding under ﬁrst best and switching from a type I contract to
a contract that uses savings increases welfare.
Under full commitment, the standard symmetric risk-sharing contract is station-
ary and equal Pareto weights imply equal-sharing across agents in each state and
period. More formally, we can now summarize the structure of the optimal contract
as follows:
Summary 1
1. At t0 each agents pays a positive ex-ante transfer B(t), which is identical across
individuals, into the group savings fund.
2. At date t1, the nB(t) ex-ante transfers are distributed among the n−k agents
with a low income realization.
3. At date t2, the k agents with a high income realization make a (positive or
negative) ex-post transfers τh
k to the n−k agents with a low income realization.
Each agent saves (or dissaves)
(1+r)A(t)−A(t+1)
n
To reiterate, if B ≥ 0 and A>0, then this describes a type II contract, in which
ex-ante payments are potentially made at date t0 and ex-post transfers, savings and
consumption are decided at date t2. Equally, if B = 0 and A = 0, then this describes
a type I contract. No payments are made at date t0, there is no opportunity for
storage and ex-post transfers and consumption are decided at date t2.
Finally, the welfare properties of the ﬁrst-best contract derived above are sum-
marized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1
141. Under ﬁrst best, the expected utility from participating in a type II contract
is independent of the size of B. That is, the expected utility from a contract
that uses savings and ex-post transfers is equal to the expected utility from a
contract that uses savings and ex-ante transfer.
2. Under ﬁrst best, a household is better oﬀ in a type II contract than in a type I
contract and welfare is increasing in the savings level of an insurance group.
3.3 The Second-Best Contract for a given group size
We now consider an environment in which contracts are not legally enforceable. In-
stead risk-sharing contracts must be self-enforcing, which requires that at any point
in time the beneﬁt from complying with the contract must outweigh the gain from
reneging. In particular, we require risk-sharing groups to be robust not only with
respect to individual deviations but also with respect to deviations by subgroups,
provided that these subgroups are themselves robust with respect to further devi-
ations. That is, we are looking for the subset of coalition-proof equilibria of the
set of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the game. This appears to be a natural
restriction on the set of enforceable contracts. If a large group can form to reap the
beneﬁts from risk-sharing, then a smaller group can do the same and threaten to
deviate jointly from the existing arrangement if the payoﬀs from doing so outweigh
the costs.
To deﬁne the set of self-enforcing contracts, we follow Genicot and Ray (2003)
and assess the stability of a risk-sharing group of given size n recursively by ﬁrst
examining the stability of groups of size 1,...,n − 1 and then checking whether a
risk-sharing contract exists for a group of given size n that is robust with respect
to deviations by stable subgroups. In the next subsection, we go a step further
by examining all the stable groups and self-enforcing contracts that emerge in a
community of size N.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. At date t0 before the state of nature is realized, every agent makes an ex-ante
transfer B that is kept in the group savings fund.
2. At date t1, the state of nature is revealed and the nB ex-ante transfers are
transferred to the n − k agents with a low income realization.
3. At date t2, all agents are asked to save 1
n((1 + r)A(t) − A(t + 1)) and make




n +B, then agents with a high income realization are called
upon to make a transfer τh
k .
15– If the enforcement constraints are satisﬁed, transfers are made and
the group continues.
– If the enforcement constraints are violated, no further transfers are




n +B, then agents with a low income realization are called
upon to make a transfer k
n−kτh
k .
– If the enforcement constraints are satisﬁed, transfers are made and
the group continues.
– If the enforcement constraints are violated, no further transfers are
made and the group collapses.
We postulate that noncompliance with a risk-sharing arrangement has the fol-
lowing eﬀects.
Assumption 1 If a sub-group of size m reneges from an insurance arrangement
of size n at t2, the capital stock A(t) of the insurance group is distributed equally
among the n agents. The nB ex-ante transfers are distributed among the n − k
agents with a low income realization. The deviating sub-group is forever excluded
from the existing arrangement, but may continue risk-sharing amongst themselves
after breaching the contract.
Assumption 1 eﬀectively imposes the condition that the group follows the ﬁrst-
best sharing rule outlined in Summary 1 up to the moment of deviation at date
t2: assets are shared equally and are not expropriated in order to punish deviating
agents; ex-ante transfers are distributed among the n − k agents with a low income
realization. Consequently, consumption in the case of deviation is written as
ˆ ch













k(t + 1) (18)
where ˆ a denotes next period’s per capita assets in the deviating subgroup.
Even though the ex-ante transfers raised at t0 are used to pay part of the state-
contingent transfers at date t2, we should not think of them exclusively as insurance
premia. In the second-best contract, they form a crucial part of the enforcement
mechanism of the contract. The contract demands that the nB ex-ante transfers
are distributed to those agents with a low income realization at t1 and inspection
of equations (17) and (18) shows the impact of this on the enforcement constraints.
Under the ﬁrst-best equal sharing rule, transfers will always ﬂow from agents with
a high income realization to agents with a low income realization and so the ex-ante
16transfers reduce the payoﬀ from deviating for an agent with a high income real-
ization. However, the scope for using ex-ante transfers to alleviate the enforcement
constraints is limited: Because the contract stipulates that agents with a low income
realization receive the ex-ante transfers in case the group breaks down they have
an incentive to bring about this collapse. As a result, agents with a high income
realization may have incentives to overcompensate in some states of the world oc-
casionally leading to those with a low income realization being allocated a higher
share of resources in order to keep the group together. Nevertheless, redistribut-
ing ex-ante transfers as set out in Assumption 1 will make it easier to enforce an
arrangement and we will prove this formally below.2
Our treatment of the ex-ante transfers is similar to Gauthier et al. (1997) who
examine the role of ex-ante transfers in a bilateral self-enforcing risk-sharing con-
tract that is non-stationary. The authors demonstrate that ex-ante payments are
transferred at t0 from the agent with the lower expected surplus from the arrange-
ment in period t to the agent with a higher expected surplus. In other words, the
more likely that an agent will want to deviate from the arrangement, the higher will
be his ex-ante payment. Gauthier and Poitevin show that these payments can be ex-
plicitly linked to contract enforcement by interpreting them as a state-independent
net penalty that is decided upon by the agents at the beginning of the period, is
paid only in case of breach of contract and is fully enforceable. Such a contract is
possible in an environment in which it is possible to verify that the contract has
been breached, but the guilty party cannot be identiﬁed. In the context of an infor-
mal insurance arrangement, it is easy to think of examples for this. If an agent is
excluded from the arrangement, is that because he deliberately did not pay his con-
tributions, or because the rest of the group decided that his inability to contribute
over a certain time period turned him into a liability to the group.
The main diﬀerence in our paper is that we are solving for the symmetric and
stationary self-enforcing risk-sharing contract. As we will show formally below, in
the second-best stationary and symmetric contract, all agents will gain the same
expected utility from the risk-sharing arrangement in period t. Consequently, there
is no role for using ex-ante payments in the way modelled by Gauthier and Poitevin
because all agents are equal ex-ante. Instead, the contract modelled in this paper
stipulates that ex-ante payments are stored in the group savings fund until t1 when
2Alternative assumptions would be that all agents forfeit the ex-ante transfers or that ex-ante
transfers are always used for smoothing in case the group collapses. In the latter case, the ex-ante









n + B, then those with a low income realization receive
k(h−l)
n + B and those with a
high income realization receive B −
(n−k)(h−l)
n and full smoothing is achieved by use of the ex-ante
transfers alone. In either case, those with a low income realization would never experience a binding
constraint. We believe that our assumption is more plausible because it explicitly takes account of
the fact that ex-ante transfers are not a ’cost-less’ enforcement mechanism.
17they are distributed among the n − k agents with a low income realization. This is
equivalent to posting a bond that is kept by the group saving fund between period
t0 and t1 and that is transferred from the high agents to the low agents in case the
group collapses. In other words, the net penalty is paid by the agent who has a
larger incentive to deviate ex-post.
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that this implies more stringent demands on the
group’s ability to enforce contracts than in the Gauthier and Poitevin environment.
On the one hand, this may be a valid criticism. Firstly, we assume that the ex-ante
payments can be safely stored in the group saving fund without the risk of embez-
zlement or other irregularities. Secondly, in line with Gauthier and Poitevin, we
assume that ex-ante payments can be enforced, that it is possible to verify that the
contract has been breached - but not by whom, and that income is both observable
and veriﬁable. The latter implies that the disposal of the ex-ante transfers can be
conditioned on agents’ income realizations at date t1 in case of breach of contract,
which is equivalent to adjusting the sign of the net penalty – but not its size – once
the state of the world is known. On the other hand, it could be argued that our
model is less demanding in terms of the complexity of the second-best contract.
Extending Gauthier and Poitevin’s model from a bilateral to a multilateral environ-
ment would require specifying a unique ex-ante transfer for each of the n agents in
the group that is conditional on agent i’s expected surplus from the arrangement. In
contrast, our model has no agent speciﬁc features and only distinguishes agents by
their current income realization, which substantially simpliﬁes the contract struc-
ture. This seems to ﬁt well with common practice in insurance groups in developing
country contexts: groups for the most part treat their members identically.
Having discussed the one-period eﬀect of deviation, we now turn to the long-run
eﬀect of being excluded from an insurance arrangement in case of deviation. To do
this, we deﬁne stability of an insurance group recursively. Our deﬁnition of stability
is related to the notion of coalition-proofness and stability derived in Bernheim
et al. (1987), Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Genicot and Ray (2003). A group of
size n is considered stable if there is no subgroup that can credibly deviate from the
arrangement. A credible deviation requires that the subgroup in which insurance
is continued, is better oﬀ after deviation and that the subgroup itself is stable with
respect to further deviations.
We begin with an individual household and deﬁne the expected discounted life-







k(t)) + βV(A(t +1 ) ,1)

(19)
Since there are no possible deviations, stability of an individual is of course guaran-
18teed.
This deﬁnition of a stable payoﬀ is now extended to an arrangement of size
n. Recursively having deﬁned sets of stable payoﬀs for arrangements of size m =
1,...,n−1, we consider a coalition of size n. The expected utility for agent i of being









k(t)) + βV i(A(t +1 ) ,n)

. (20)
Such an arrangement will be stable if no stable subgroup of size m ≤ n − 1 can
credibly deviate from it.
Since the full commitment contract prescribes equal sharing any departure from
this rule must arise because deviation payoﬀs diﬀer across agents. From Assump-
tion 1, deviation payoﬀs only diﬀer according to an agent’s current income realiza-
tion and not according to their accumulated capital. Similarly, because we restrict
ourselves to ﬁnding the coalition-proof stationary and symmetric risk-sharing con-
tract, current consumption is not conditioned on the previous history of shocks
(or more precisely the previous history of binding constraints) in order to sustain
more risk-sharing as it would be in a dynamic contract. Stationarity implies that
V i(A(t),n)=V i(A(t + r),n) whenever A(t)=A(t + r). Together with symmetry,
it follows that V i(A(t),n)=V j(A(t),n)=V (A(t),n). To summarize, under the
restriction of stationarity, the constrained contract depends on the enforcement con-
straints in period t, but is not aﬀected by the previous history of binding constraints.
Of course, the presence of savings implies that both period t and period t+1 enter
the calculation of the optimal contract at time t because beginning of period assets
in period t+1 are determined by the savings behaviour in period t. Equally, because
savings in period t aﬀect the deviation payoﬀ in period t+1, enforcement constraints
in both periods are potentially relevant for solving for the optimal contract. In other
words, in our formulation the stationary contract depends both on current and
future binding constraints. An alternative - and more restrictive - interpretation of
stationarity would be that future constraints arising out of the savings behaviour of
the group are to be ignored.
Because of the introduction of ex-ante transfers and savings, both high income
and low income individuals may gain from deviating from the insurance arrangement
and this has to be taken into account when deﬁning the enforcement constraints.
Any self-enforcing contract σ = {c,B,a} must at a minimum satisfy the following
constraints in period t
u(ch
k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ ch
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ k
u(cl
k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ cl
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ n-k
19However, this is not suﬃcient to guarantee stability. Let σ = {c,B,a} be a
contract that satisﬁes the above inequalities. It may still be possible that a deviation
that involves both high and low income agents may destabilize the group because
of the way savings are shared among members. Brieﬂy, suppose the risk-sharing
arrangement consists of ﬁve members with three high income realizations in the
current period and ex-ante transfers low enough such that an agent with a low
income realization receives a positive ex-post transfer at t2. If savings weren’t shared
in the group, we would never have to consider a joint deviation of high and low draws
at this stage, because the low draws do not stand to gain anything from deviating.
However, with shared savings, one of the low draws may ﬁnd it in his interest to
join the three high draws in a deviation, because this deviating subgroup potentially
starts with a higher per capita capital stock in the following period than the existing
group. The same argument can be made when the high draws stand to receive a
positive transfer at date t2. Formally, for σ to be a self-enforcing contract, it must
not be the case that
u(ch
k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) <u (ˆ ch
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m)
∀ m = i + j ≤ n − 1,i ≤ k,j ≤ n − k
u(cl
k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) <u (ˆ cl
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m)
∀ m = i + j ≤ n − 1,i ≤ k,j ≤ n − k
Denote this set as Ω∗
t. It is then easy to see that any σ, which is not a member
of Ω∗
t, cannot be a self-enforcing contract: If both inequalities above hold, then for
a given B and a, satisfying the inequality would require increasing both ch
k(t) and
cl
k(t), which is impossible without violating the aggregate resource constraint.
The above results in the following deﬁnition of stability
Deﬁnition 1 An arrangement of size n is stable for a contract σ = {c,B,a} if,
and only if, for every possible beginning of period capital A(t) and states k in
20period t and j in period t +1 , the following inequality constraints are satisﬁed
(1) V ∗(A(t),n) ≥ V ∗(
m
n
A(t),m) ∀ stable m
(2a) u(ch
k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) ≥




k(t + 1)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ k
(2b) u(cl








k(t + 1)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ n − k.
(3a) u(ch
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗(A(t +2 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ ch
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +2 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ j
(3b) u(cl
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗(A(t +2 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ cl
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +2 ) ,m) ∀ stable m ≤ n − j
(4) σ ∈ Ω∗
t.
This deﬁnition states that an arrangement is stable if at all times the individual
prefers making the contractual transfers and savings to reneging on the contract
and continuing insurance within a stable arrangement of size m<n . Constraint
(1) is an ex-ante constraint, which must hold at date t0. Constraints (2a) − (2b)
are the ex-post constraints in period t and must hold at date t2 when consumption
actually takes place. Constraints (3a) − (3b) are the ex-post constraints in period
t + 1. The enforcement constraints show clearly how ex-ante transfers B can be
used to alleviate the ex-post constraints by reducing the utility from deviating for
an agent with a high income realization. However, this comes at a price since the
ex-ante transfers increase the deviation payoﬀ of those with a low income realization
and this limits the scope for using ex-ante transfers to relax ex-post enforcement
constraints. Condition (4) states that any self-enforcing contract σ has to be an
element of Ω∗
t, which ensures that there are no joint deviations of low and high draws
that destabilize the group. Finally, note that the deﬁnition of stability nests the sub-
game perfect contract, which is stable only with respect to individual deviations.
This is simply the set of contracts described by setting m = 1 in Deﬁnition 1, which
includes all the coalition-proof contracts.
Having deﬁned the set of self-enforcing contracts, we can now compute the op-
timal constrained contract as the coalition-proof equilibrium of a stationary and
symmetric risk-sharing game with savings and ex-ante transfers. This is done by
solving the following dynamic maximization programme:



























k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ ch
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m)






k(t)) + βV ∗(A(t +1 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ cl
k(t)) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m)





j(t +1 ) : u(ch
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗(A(t +2 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ ch
j(t + 1))) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +1 ) ,m)





j(t +1 ) : u(cl
j(t + 1)) + βV ∗(A(t +2 ) ,n) ≥ u(ˆ cl
j(t + 1))) + βV ∗( ˆ A(t +2 ) ,m)





k(t)+( n − k)cl




ηj(t +1 ) : jch
j(t +1 )+( n − j)cl
j(t +1 )+A(t +2 )
≤ (1 + r)A(t +1 )+jh+( n − j)l (27)
ν(t):B(t) ≤ B (28)
χ(t +1 ) : A(t +1 )≤ A (29)
where the Lagrange multipliers μ and η in each state and time period are scaled for
convenience by the probability of this state occurring. For simplicity, we omit the
ex-ante enforcement constraint and the lower bounds on B(t) and A(t + 1).
The ﬁrst-order condition for consumption in period t is given by
(1 + μh
k(t))u (ch
k(t)) = ηk(t)=( 1+μl
k(t))u (cl
k(t)) (30)
To put it simply, the ﬁrst-order condition states that if the enforcement constraint is
binding for individuals with a high income draw their consumption is to be increased.
In the opposite case, their consumption is to be decreased. In contrast to a dynamic
contract where the ratio of Pareto weights is time-dependent, the ratio of Pareto
weights here depends only on the current state of the system, which in turn depends
on the income realization, beginning of period assets, the ex-ante payment, and the
size of the maximum stable subgroup that threatens to deviate.
To ﬁnd the ﬁrst order condition with respect to ah
k(t + 1) and al
k(t + 1), we use

























k(t+1). Now we can substitute from the ﬁrst order condition
for consumption in period t and t + 1 to get the standard conditions for optimal
saving in a limited commitment risk-sharing contract (see Ligon et al. (2000)).
(1 + μk
h(t))u (ch























j(t + 1)) − u (ˆ ch
j(t + 1)))
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The ﬁrst thing to note is that the right-hand sides of (32) and (33) are identical




k), (32) and (33) have the same
solution. Hence it follows that the ﬁrst-order condition for capital only determines
total savings in a symmetric and stationary risk-sharing contract and it is optimal
to allocate high and low income individuals an equal share of capital. Therefore, if
we implicitly assume that everyone had initial savings of A
n(0) in the ﬁrst period,
there is no loss of generality in assuming that savings are held in a communal fund
with each agent having a claim to savings of A
n(t).
The terms u (ˆ cl
j) and u (ˆ cl
j) appear on the right-hand side of (32) and (33), be-
23cause a deviating sub-group is allowed to keep its share of assets. If μh
j = μl
j =0 ,
the latter term drops out and we have the usual Euler equation for savings. The sign
of the second term in (32) determines the impact of the enforcement constraints on




j) − u (ˆ cl
j), which in turn depends on whether consumption prescribed by the
risk-sharing contract is higher or lower than consumption in the case of deviation.
If u (c
j
h) >u  (ˆ c
j
h) for example, then additional saving relaxes the enforcement con-
straint because the marginal gain of additional savings is greater when remaining in
the arrangement rather than deviating. The opposite applies when u (ˆ c
j
h) >u  (c
j
h).
Therefore, if the second term is positive, then current consumption will be lower rel-
ative to future consumption than under ﬁrst-best. Alternatively, if it is negative, a
binding enforcement constraint requires that current consumption is raised relative
to the ﬁrst-best outcome (see Ligon et al. (2000) for similar results in the dynamic
bilateral contract with savings).
Given the ambiguous eﬀect of increasing storage embodied in the ﬁrst-order
condition, it follows that the eﬀect of storage on welfare is also ambiguous. The


















































which is equivalent to the ﬁrst order condition for capital in (32). The ﬁrst term is
positive and equal to the envelope condition in the ﬁrst-best contract. The size of
the second and third term are only positive if extra storage relaxes the enforcement
constraints. If not, then larger savings have a negative eﬀect on the beneﬁts from
risk-sharing. Therefore the overall eﬀect of savings is ambiguous. The eﬀect of





This is unambiguously positive and equal to the ﬁrst-best condition. Note however,
that (35) only calculates the eﬀect for a given n. This ignores the fact that increas-
ing A would also allow stable sub-groups of n – including individuals – to switch
from type I to a Pareto superior contract that uses savings, thereby making the
24enforcement constraints harder to satisfy. Hence, under imperfect enforcement, the
impact of savings is generally ambiguous.










k(t))] − ν(t)=0 . (36)
To show that the optimal ex-ante payment is nonnegative, the ﬁrst-order condition
is evaluated when B = 0. In this case, the optimal contract requires that high
draw households make a positive transfer to low draw households in each state. If
a stable contract exists, then enforcement constraints cannot bind for both high
and low draw households and in fact will bind only for the former. By assumption








k(t))] > 0, (37)
which cannot be optimal. Decreasing B will not lead to equality of the ﬁrst-order
condition, because u (ˆ ch
k) > 0 for all values of B and μh
k is decreasing in B. Therefore
the optimal ex-ante payment must be positive, which implies that the lower bound
on the ex-ante transfer will never bind. Furthermore, the ex-ante transfers are
transferred from the savings fund to those agents whose enforcement constraint is
slack - which are of course the agents with a low income realization in our case.
This is the case, because optimality in a symmetric and stationary risk-sharing
arrangement stipulates that the low income draw agent will never be asked to make
a transfer as long as ex-ante transfers are zero and so they will always have a net
gain from remaining in the arrangement. Therefore a small redistribution of ex-
ante transfers towards agents with a low income realization will not make their
enforcement constraint binding but will relax the enforcement constraint of the
agents with a high income realization. Of course, if the redistribution becomes
too large then the ex-post enforcement constraint for agents with a low income
realization may start to bind because it may be in their interest to make the group
collapse. It follows from (36) and (37) that it is optimal to increase B until either
the ﬁrst best contract is achieved, low income households have a binding constraint
in at least one state or the ex-ante payment reaches its maximum value. Since
a household with a binding constraint receives a larger share of resources than a
household with a slack constraint, there are states in which consumption of low
income draw households exceeds that of high income draw households. This applies
to both the sub-game perfect and the coalition-proof contract and ex-ante transfers
are therefore generally bounded by the imperfect enforcement constraints.
This entire discussion may suggest that there is no role for the upper bound
25B in our model. This is certainly true under ﬁrst best where the upper bound
constraint is trivial. Similarly, it is possible to conceive of a second-best contract
in which the ex-ante transfer is purely bounded by the enforcement constraints
making the upper bound B again irrelevant. However, as the ex-ante payment has
to be credible introducing a bound is a natural assumption as credibility requires
ﬁnancial feasibility of the payment in all states of the world. Consequently, the
maximal upper bound we could consider would be l, the income in the low state of
the world. This would ensure that the bond can always be paid regardless of an
agent’s income realization and the level of savings accumulated by the group. It is
therefore credible in every state of the world.3 However, this payment may still be
larger than what could ever be credibly enforced in the community, so let us deﬁne
B = ζl
where ζ, which lies between 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1, expresses the extent to which a maximal
payment can be enforced. For example, agents may be wealthy enough to raise a
bond, but don’t have enough trust that their ex-ante payments and savings can be
kept safely by one of the group members. Deﬁned in this way, it is clear that the
maximal B is not just related to the ability to make a ﬁnancial transfer but also
to the overall social cohesion of the group including the social pressure it can bring
to bear on group members ex-ante to act in the interests of the group.4 Similarly,
we could think of ζ as a parameter expressing a direct link between social cohesion
and a group’s ability to agree on credible formal rules. In either case, the more a
group can make use of these mechanisms, the more robust it will be with respect to
deviations. This leads us naturally to interpret B, the maximum size of the bond,
as a measure of overall group cohesion which is increasing in social cohesion and the
maximum feasible payment which depends on the guaranteed liquid means available
to each member:
Deﬁnition 2 The maximum size of the bond B is a measure of the cohesion of the
insurance group. The cohesion of a group is an increasing function of the social
cohesion of the group and the maximum ﬁnancially feasible ex-ante transfer it can
levy:
B = Group Cohesion = ζl = f(social cohesion,maximum ﬁnancially feasible ex-ante transfer)
(38)
Introducing the upper bound on the ex-ante transfers not only leads to a deﬁni-
3Of course, the fact that l is the the maximum ex-ante payment that can be levied is a conse-
quence of the no-borrowing constraint.
4In fact, a number of authors (see Anderson et al. (2008)) argue that social pressure is used to
assist in enforcing contracts.
26tion of group cohesion, but also allows us to make precise welfare statements about
insurance groups that use ex-ante transfers and savings. Writing down the envelope
condition for B, it follows that increasing the upper bound on the ex-ante transfer
unequivocally increases the beneﬁts from risk-sharing for a given group size
∂V(A(t),n)
∂B
= νt ≥ 0 (39)
Quite simply, increasing B increases the set from which B can be chosen and this has
a positive eﬀect on the expected utility from risk-sharing. In other words, welfare is
increasing in group cohesion as deﬁned in (38). However, it should again be noted
that (39) ignores the fact that increasing B also allows subgroups to use ex-ante
transfers. This may increase their beneﬁts from risk-sharing in a type II contract
and therefore make it harder to satisfy the enforcement constraints.
The results for the constrained-eﬃcient savings and ex-ante transfers in a self-
enforcing contract for a given n are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
1. The eﬀect of savings on the beneﬁts from risk-sharing conditional on group
size are ambiguous in a self-enforcing type II risk-sharing contract. That is
∂V(A(t),n)
∂A(t)  0.
2. The optimal ex-ante payment in the self-enforcing risk-sharing contract is
strictly positive in a type II contract.
3. If the ﬁrst-best contract is not self-enforcing, then either the optimal ex-ante
payment is set to its maximum level or there is a state in which households
with a low income realization have higher consumption than households with
a high income realization.




5. In a self-enforcing type II risk-sharing contract, the beneﬁts from risk-sharing
conditional on group size are increasing in the upper bound on the ex-ante
transfer, B,
∂V(A(t),n)
∂B > 0. Therefore welfare is increasing in group cohesion.
We can now compare the properties of the second-best contract for a given stable n
to the ﬁrst-best contract. It follows from part (1) of the proposition that the eﬀect
of increasing savings in a type II contract is no longer unambiguous under second-
best. This is of course the case because an increase in savings both increases the
beneﬁts from remaining in the existing arrangement as well as raising the beneﬁts
27from deviation. In terms of switching from a type I contract into a type II contract,
the predictions for the ﬁrst-best and the second-best contract are the same, welfare
is unambiguously increased (part (4) of the proposition). Note, however, that in
the case of second-best this ignores the fact that stable sub-groups can now also
resort to savings. Finally, part (5) of the proposition tells us that in contrast to
the ﬁrst-best environment, type II contracts are Pareto ranked by the level of group
cohesion as measured by the maximum ex-ante transfer that can be raised. This
is the case because the ex-ante transfers are an important part of the enforcement
mechanisms of the contract which only come into play when the contract is required
to be self-enforcing.
3.4 The second-best contract for all stable group sizes
Having analyzed the constrained-optimal risk-sharing contract for a given group
size and shown analytically that type II contracts are Pareto superior to type I
contracts, the fact that we observe both type I and type II contracts in the same
community still presents something of a puzzle. Of course, the results we have
derived are only valid for a given n, which may simply not be stable. Therefore, to
understand whether our welfare predictions extend to a community of size N ≥ n,
we must examine all the stable groups and self-enforcing contracts that emerge in a
community of size N ≥ n.
There is no reason to presume that the analytical monotonicity results derived for
a given n in Proposition 2 extend to the set of stable sizes in the community. This is
the case because the introduction of savings increases the beneﬁts from risk-sharing
by allowing for more consumption smoothing over time, but they also increase the
beneﬁts from deviation by raising the possibility of self-insurance. In other words,
while the introduction of savings allows a given group to switch to a Pareto superior
contract, this is also true for all stable subgroups – including individuals – and this
potentially destabilizes larger groups. If the latter eﬀect outweighs the former, then
the beneﬁts from risk-sharing may be smaller with savings than without because
the beneﬁts from risk-sharing are also increasing in the size of the insurance pool.
Similarly, the introduction of ex-ante transfers has two conﬂicting consequences
which potentially work in opposite directions. It increases risk-sharing for a given
group size and this result of course extends to stable subgroups of larger groups.
Because these subgroups derive a larger gain from risk-sharing with ex-ante transfers
in a type II contract larger groups that would have been stable in the absence of
ex-ante transfers may now be destabilized. Because of this analytical ambiguity, we
turn to simulations to investigate how the possibility of ex-ante transfers and savings
aﬀects the beneﬁts from risk-sharing over all stable group sizes in a community. We
do this both for the sub-game perfect contract and the coalition-proof contract.
28As we will see, solving for equilibria of the risk-sharing game that are both sub-
game perfect as well as coalition-proof is not just conceptually superior. Unless
we require insurance groups to be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, we
cannot understand why type I and type II contracts coexist.
To conduct the simulations, we parameterize the model in Section 3.3 and com-
pute the optimal stable contract for a variety of preferences. We calculate the
expected utility from risk-sharing over the set of stable sizes and show how diﬀerent
maximum B’s may lead to the selection of diﬀerent contracts. To reiterate, the
diﬀerent contracts available are:
1. Type I: B =0 ,A =0⇒ no ex-ante transfers and no savings.
2. Type II: B ≥ 0,A>0 ⇒ ex-ante transfer and savings.
We maximize the dynamic programme in (21) and solve for ex-ante transfers,
ex-post transfers and savings in a risk-sharing arrangement of n individuals in a





where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. In each period, individual income
is l with probability (1 − p) and h with probability p, with h>l . The discount
rate is β and r = 1
β − 1 is the interest rate. For type II contracts, we calculate the
optimal contract on a capital grid for individual capital that ranges from [0,a] and
a = 1. Furthermore, we compute the upper bound on the ex-ante transfers as laid
out in the deﬁnition of group cohesion B = ζl and let ζ = {0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1} vary
from zero to 1. We compare the payoﬀs from these contracts to a type I contract
without savings in which A = 0. Since ex-ante transfers are transferred into the
group savings fund between date t0 and date t1, this of course implies that in the
absence of savings ζl = B = 0 in a type I contract. We compute contracts for twenty
diﬀerent combinations of environmental and preference parameters. Speciﬁcally, we
vary the discount factor and the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and calculate the model
for the following parameterizations: β = {0.81, 0.82, 0.83, 0.84, 0.85, 0.86, 0.87, 0.88,
0.89, 0.9}, ﬁxing ρ =1 .2, and letting ρ = {1.1,1.2,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6,1.7,1.8,1.9,2.0},
keeping β constant at 0.85. The probability of a high income realization is always
set to p =0 .5 and h =0 .75 and l =0 .25.
To measure the payoﬀs from diﬀerent contract types, we calculate the relative
gain from being in a stable arrangement of size n compared to the maximal per
capita payoﬀ that can be achieved, i.e. the ﬁrst-best payoﬀ  V (a,N). To make
the notation more transparent, we introduce two more arguments ζ and a into the
expected utility function to write V ∗(a,n,ζ,a). Then the payoﬀ from a type I
29contract in a group of size n is given by
V ∗(a,n,0,0) − V ∗(a,1,0,0)
 V (a,N,1,1) − V ∗(a,1,0,0)
× 100. (41)
The payoﬀ from a type II contract is given by
V ∗(a,n,ζ,1) − V ∗(a,1,0,0)
 V (a,N,1,1) − V ∗(a,1,0,0)
× 100. (42)
This gives a measure of the return to insurance in percentage terms (see Genicot
and Ray (2003)). Since the largest stable group will typically be smaller than the
community and not all groups within a community will be stable, the question arises
which group sizes will be observed and how the relevant payoﬀ of being in a particular
group can be calculated. Following Genicot and Ray (2003), the population is
partitioned into stable groups in a way that maximizes the expected utility of an
agent under the assumption that the probability of being in a group is proportional
to the size of the group.
Figure 1 plots the largest stable group and Figure 2 plots the expected stable
gain for the equilibrium conﬁguration of group sizes for diﬀerent contract types as
ζ varies from zero to one. In each ﬁgure, the top two panels plot the results for
the sub-game perfect contract and the bottom two panels plot the results for the
coalition-proof contract.
We ﬁrst focus on the sub-game perfect contract. It is notable from Figure 1
that a type I contract is always stable for the whole community. This is the case,
because the set of group sizes that is stable with respect to individual deviations
is a connected and unbounded set in a stationary risk-sharing contract without
savings (Genicot and Ray (2003)). In other words, if we can ﬁnd a group of size
n that is stable, then all n  >nwill be stable. As a result, as long as N is large
enough, the type I contract is always stable for the whole community. The reason
that the type I contract is a connected set is that a group of size n can replicate the
autarky outcome and add an  -beneﬁt to it, so enforcement constraints for individual
deviations can always be satisﬁed. This is not the case for the type II contracts. In
fact, without the use of ex-ante transfers, type II contracts are not even stable with
respect to individual deviations, which is easily seen from the fact that the largest
stable group size is one for ζ<0.25. This is the case because the type II contract
requires that savings are shared equally, which implies that the contract cannot
replicate the autarky outcome in order to satisfy the enforcement constraints. Once
we introduce ex-ante payments, this limitation can be overcome to some extent.
However, the set of group sizes that is stable with respect to individual deviations
will not be unbounded because as n increases the maximum ex-ante payment that
30can be raised is limited by the requirement that those with a low income realization
do not have an incentive to deviate.
Moving on to the coalition-proof contract, it is notable from Figure 1 that the
largest stable size for both type I and type II contracts is signiﬁcantly smaller than
the community for most parameters and that there appears to be no monotone
relationship between the ability of a group to use ex-ante transfers and/or savings
and the maximal stable size of the insurance arrangement. In fact, for type II
groups the largest stable group size is obtained for ζ =0 .5 in the case of β =0 .88.
Conversely, both for large ζ and small ζ, only smaller groups are stable. This
non-monotonicity is a direct consequence of requiring the optimal contract to be
coalition-proof. Because the beneﬁt from risk-sharing is increasing in ζ for a given
group size, smaller groups have a more destabilizing eﬀect when ζ is large. In
contrast, for small but non-zero ζ, there are a few environments in which large
groups are stable because the beneﬁts from risk-sharing for small groups are not
large enough to destabilize the community. For similar reasons, there are a number
of parameterizations in which type I groups are bigger than type II groups. Finally,
it is notable that groups which use type II contracts and are required to be robust
with respect to coalitional deviations are not much smaller than groups that are
only required to be robust with respect to individual deviations. This is the case,
because in the case of type II contracts, the impact of the ex-ante transfers on
the enforcement constraints, which is independent of the long-term payoﬀ from
deviations, drives most of the results.
Since the largest stable group is not increased signiﬁcantly by the use of ex-
ante transfers and savings, any overall welfare eﬀect (if it exists at all) has to work
through an increase in the beneﬁts from risk-sharing for a given group size and/or
an increase in the number of members of the set of stable sizes. Figure 2 explores
these eﬀects by plotting the expected stable gain for type I and II contracts against
diﬀerent values of the discount factor and the coeﬃcient of risk-aversion. In each
ﬁgure, the top two panels present the results for the sub-game perfect contract and
the bottom two panels represent the eﬀects for the coalition-proof contract.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the comparison of type II contracts for diﬀerent values of ζ
and l. The most important thing to note from Figure 2 is that the higher the value
of ζ the higher the expected utility from being in a type II contract and that for the
most part the lines for diﬀerent values of ζ do not cross (there are two exceptions).
Therefore the beneﬁt from risk-sharing in a type II group is increasing in the level
of group cohesion for a given environment, i.e. conditional on a, β, ρ and l, and the
analytical result proved in part (5.) of Proposition 2 for a given group size extends
to the set of all stable sizes. This implies that in the second-best environment, type






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33stands in clear contrast to the ﬁrst-best environment in which type II contracts that
use ex-ante transfers are equivalent in terms of welfare to type II contracts which
use ex-post transfers.
Even so, for the sub-game perfect contract, the expected beneﬁt from being in
a type I contract always outweighs the beneﬁt from being in a type II contract
regardless of the level of group cohesion. This is the case because type I contracts
are stable at the level of the community whereas type II contracts are signiﬁcantly
smaller. It also implies that if the beneﬁts from risk-sharing are only limited by
contracts being stable with respect to individual deviations, then groups would
always select into type I contracts. In other words, the predictions under second-
best and sub-game perfection are precisely the opposite to the predictions in a
ﬁrst-best world.
Once we require both type I and type II contracts to be coalition-proof, it be-
comes optimal to switch from a type I contract to a contract that allows for the
possibility of savings for suﬃciently high levels of ζl. Certainly for low levels of
ζl, there are a number of parameterizations in which the beneﬁts from a type I
contract outweigh the beneﬁts from a type II contract. This is precisely the nature
of second-best solutions. Even though a contract that uses savings is always Pareto
superior under ﬁrst best, the requirement that the contract must be coalition-proof
provides strong incentives to select into a contract that would be inferior under full
enforceability. Only for large enough levels of group cohesion is it always optimal
to switch into a type II contract. Since welfare in a type II contract is increas-
ing in group cohesion, this implies that those choosing type II contracts over type
I contracts are always better oﬀ in a given environment. Overall then, requiring
coalition-proofness is not just conceptually superior. We can only explain why type
I and type II contracts coexist – and groups are smaller than the community – when
contracts are required to be coalition-proof.
These results have strong implications for the welfare ranking and selection of
diﬀerent contract types that are coalition-proof over the set of all stable group sizes,
which are summarized in Conjecture 3:
Conjecture 3 : Welfare Eﬀects of Contract Selection
1. For low levels of group cohesion, type I contracts sometimes dominate type II
contracts.
2. For high levels of group cohesion, type II contracts always dominate type I
contracts.
3. Welfare is increasing in group cohesion so that those for whom a type II con-
tract is observed in a given environment will have higher welfare than those in
34a type I contract.
Comparing these results to part (4) and (5) Proposition 2, it follows that the welfare
predictions for B extend to the set of stable sizes, whereas an increase in A does not
lead to a welfare improvement unless B is suﬃciently high. In other words, while
savings are a necessary precondition for raising a bond in practical terms, raising
a bond is a necessary precondition for making savings feasible in the presence of
coalitional deviations.5 By implication, Conjecture 3 predicts that we observe type
I and type II contracts side-by-side, but that for a given environment, those able to
select into type II contracts will be better oﬀ than those in type I contracts.
The relationship between levels of group cohesion and contract selection in the
coalition-proof contract is summarized in Conjecture 4.
Conjecture 4 : Group/Social Cohesion and Contract Selection
1. Among groups with low to intermediate levels of group cohesion both type I
and type II contracts are observed.
2. Groups with high group cohesion always select into type II contracts.
3. Selection into type II contracts is a positively related to group cohesion.
4. For a given l, selection into type II contracts is positively related to social
cohesion.
3.5 The empirical model
The theoretical and numerical results show that contracts are welfare ranked in
terms of group cohesion so that those for whom a type II contract is observed
in a given environment will have higher welfare than those in a type I contract.
Of course, in practise we do not observe utility, but as is well known if agents
are risk-averse then – other things being equal – their welfare is increasing in the
extent of consumption-smoothing they achieve. In this section, we will show that
our welfare predictions can be related to the level of risk-sharing that takes place in
insurance groups (and therefore to observable measures of consumption and income).
In particular, we show that there is a one-to-one empirical relationship between the
5It is perhaps not surprising that our predictions for a given n are a reasonable guide for the
eﬀects of increasing B over the set of stable sizes, but not for A. After all, the results for B
ignore the eﬀect of better enforcement mechanisms for stable subgroups given that the contract
uses savings, whereas the results for A ignore the fact that stable subgroups can now switch into a
contract that is Pareto superior.
35extent of consumption smoothing and the welfare properties of a particular contract
in the sense that higher welfare is associated with more smoothing.
As a ﬁrst step, we show that for the class of CRRA utility functions we can derive
a relationship between own consumption and aggregate consumption of the insur-
ance group that is akin to the standard risk-sharing tests derived in the literature
but explicitly takes account of the second-best nature of the risk-sharing contract.
As above, we assume a CRRA utility function for household i’s consumption in






















Now taking logs and adding up the n − 1 ﬁrst order conditions between agent
i and the rest of the group, we can write consumption of agent i as a linearly



















































t. If we observed the Lagrange multipliers on the enforcement
constraints, then we could estimate this equation directly. While this is not possible,
the theoretical model tells us that the severity with which the agent is constrained




t), is a function of
– among other things – the agent’s own income realization and the group’s contract
structure.6 Because we are restricting attention to a stationary and symmetric risk-
sharing contract with only two possible individual income realizations, we introduce
6Strictly speaking, the theoretical model implies that the Lagrange multiplier is a function of
an agent’s own income realization, the aggregate income realization, the size of the group, and its



















t. Since we are interested in deriving an empirical speciﬁcation, we restrict
attention to y
i
t and B – partly because of data availability and partly because of the high degree
of collinearity between aggregate group consumption and aggregate savings and shocks.
36a dummy Di
t that is equal to one if an agent has a low income realization and zero














Since f is an unknown function, we expand it in order to transform (49) into a linear
estimable equation. Deﬁne ˆ x = {Di
t −Di∗,B −B
∗} and x∗ = {0,0}. This gives the







D2fi(x∗)(ˆ x, ˆ x)+R2(x,x∗); (50)
Based on this, we can write the following linear estimable equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences:
Δlnci
t = α0ΔCt + α1Δ ˆ Di
t + α2Δ( ˆ Di
t × ˆ B)+εi
t (51)
where α1 and α2 are overspeciﬁcation tests. Finding that either of them is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero indicates that full insurance is rejected – for the moment
abstracting from preference shifts and measurement error.
However, our theoretical model in conjunction with the simulations presented
above can do more. It does not only predict that full risk-sharing will be rejected,
it also allows us to give some interpretation to the sign and magnitude of the co-
eﬃcients on the overidentifying regressors. In particular, we now show that the
welfare ranking of contracts we demonstrated above has an empirical analogue in
the extent of consumption smoothing that will be observed. Intuitively, we would
expect that the superiority of a type II contract in welfare terms translates into
α1 < 0 and α2 > 0. That is, while the overall impact of a shock is negative, the fall
in consumption is less severe in a type II contract.
This is by no means self-evident, however, because the regression we have for-
mulated will only measure the beneﬁts from smoothing shocks across states, not the
beneﬁts that arise from being able to smooth shocks intertemporally, which is only
possible in a type II contract. To see this, suppose that type I groups always manage
to sustain full risk-sharing while type II groups do not. Then we may well ﬁnd that
α1 = 0 and α2 < 0 even though a type II contract allows for more intertemporal
smoothing and therefore gives higher welfare than a type I contract. Similarly, sup-
pose that all group types sustain nearly full insurance and the beneﬁt from using
ex-ante transfers and savings arises mainly from larger group sizes. In this case,
the risk-sharing test would not pick up the eﬀect of contract structure because the
37sensitivity of consumption with respect to income conditional on group resources
would be zero regardless of the magnitude of B even though expected utility clearly
increases with group cohesion as larger group sizes become stable. In other words,
the risk-sharing test reﬂects the superiority of combining ex-ante transfers and sav-
ings only if there is some departure from ﬁrst-best in the type I contract and the
extent of cross-sectional smoothing increases as we select into a type II contract.
We will now show that this is indeed the case and that our predictions on the
Pareto ranking of contracts can be directly related to the degree of cross-sectional
consumption smoothing achieved in diﬀerent contract types. To this end, we use the
computed model solutions from both the individual deviations and the coalitional
deviations model from above to estimate (51). For each parameterization (discount
factor and level of risk aversion), the community is allocated the contract type
that gives the highest payoﬀ among those that are feasible given the level of group
cohesion, ζl. We then randomly draw an income realization for each individual
in the community of size N = 10 for T = 2 periods and based on the computed
stable insurance contracts calculate consumption for every parameterization. This
generates a sample of 1100 observations (ﬁve levels of ζ × 10 agents × 11 diﬀerent
values of initial capital × two time periods) for each environment. We then estimate
(51) on this sample and record the coeﬃcients and p-values. Finally, the whole
process is repeated 100 times.
Figure 3 reports the average coeﬃcients from the Monte-Carlo simulation for the
sub-game perfect and the coalition-proof contract. The top panels report the average
coeﬃcient on group consumption, α0, for all environments, the middle panels report
the average coeﬃcient on the shock, α1, and the bottom panels report the average
coeﬃcient on the interaction, α2, of the shock variable and the contract type B = ζl,
where B has been normalized to lie between zero and one.
Let us ﬁrst compare the individual deviations model to the coalitional devia-
tions model in the top and middle panels. It is easily seen from the three sets of
panels that full risk-sharing will always be achieved in the individual deviations
contract. In contrast, the coeﬃcient on group consumption is signiﬁcantly less than
one and the impact of the shock is negative in the contract with coalitional devi-
ations. Hence, this provides another test of whether coalitional deviations present
a threat to the stability of risk-sharing arrangements. Of course, the main test of
whether coalitional deviations present a threat to stability is provided by contract
selection. Only if risk-sharing is limited by coalitional deviations will we observe
both contract types (hence the interaction of contract type and shock variable is
not plotted for the individual deviations contract). However, even aside from the
issue of contract selection, the threat of coalitional deviations has implications for
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that the welfare ranking of the diﬀerent
contract types indeed translates into a higher degree of consumption smoothing
achieved in a type II contract. For every parameterization, the coeﬃcient on the
death shock is negative and signiﬁcant, while the interaction on the death shock
variable and the level of group cohesion is always positive and signiﬁcant. Taken
together, this implies that our theoretical and numerical results can be translated
into the following two related hypotheses that will be tested in the next section.
1. H0: Risk-sharing is perfectly enforced ⇒ α0 = 1 and all other coeﬃcients
are zero. H1: Risk-sharing is imperfectly enforced ⇒ any of the coeﬃcients
{αi}2
i=1, are signiﬁcant.
2. H0: Contract I outperforms contract II ⇒ α2 ≤ 0. H1: Contract II outper-
forms contract I ⇒ α2 > 0.
4 Empirical Prediction and Estimation
Our theoretical and numerical results derived in the previous section lead to a num-
ber of predictions for contract selection and welfare in the diﬀerent contract types
which we now test using data on funeral insurance groups and their members:
Conjecture 5
Contract Selection
1. Type I and type II contracts coexist only if risk-sharing is limited by coalitional
deviations.
2. For non-zero levels of group cohesion, it is never optimal to select into a type
II contract that does not use ex-ante transfers.
3. There is a positive correlation between social cohesion and selection into type
II contracts for a given environment and preferences.
Consumption Smoothing Beneﬁts
1. Consumption smoothing in both types of contracts is restricted by coalitional
deviations.
2. The consumption smoothing beneﬁts in a type II contract are larger than the
consumption smoothing beneﬁts in a type I contract for a given environment
and preferences.
404.1 The Determinants of Contract Selection
Following our analysis of the diﬀerent contract types, it is evident that the funeral in-
surance groups we have described in Section 2 can be categorized as type I contracts
and type II contracts with non-zero levels of ex-ante transfers. The FIS contains
38 groups which use ex-post transfers and do not save and 41 groups that use ex-
ante transfers and accumulate substantial savings. As predicted, we do not observe
any groups that use ex-post transfers and accumulate savings. The co-existence in
the same villages of two contracts highlights the presence of coalitional enforcement
constraints: as the theory and simulation sections showed, only then can both be
observed. We have further hypotheses that can be tested in the data.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that social cohesion will be positively correlated with
selection into a type II contract and negatively correlated with selection into a type
I contract. The social cohesion of a group clearly depends on a number of individual
characteristics of the group’s members. As suggested in Anderson et al. (2008),
households with stronger ties in the community, stronger ties in the group, and
less mobility are more likely to make reliable members of insurance arrangements
because they are more susceptible to social and reputational pressure. Conversely,
such members may also ﬁnd it easier to enforce contract rules against others who
do not comply. Most importantly, high levels of social interconnectedness and trust
make it easier to agree on credible formal rules ex-ante. Taken together, these
observations lead to the prediction of a positive correlation between measures of
member’s reliability, trust in others and social connectedness and the social cohesion
component of group cohesion. Consequently, these variables should be positively
correlated with selection into type II contracts. Similarly, we predict that the ability
to raise ex-ante transfers and savings could be related to the wealth of the group’s
members because the ex-ante payment required to make group savings proﬁtable
may simply exceed the liquidity of poorer households.
We test these hypotheses by estimating a probit regression of contract selection
at the household level. In the regression, we capture several dimensions of social
cohesion by including information on parental background, whether belonging to a
minority ethnicity or religion in the village, whether born in the community and
whether ones father has been a member of the Iddir. We also include two measures
of the extent to which group members trust each other. The ﬁrst of these is an
’observed’ measure of trust, which records the percentage of people in a households’
informal network (deﬁned by common membership in informal labour sharing and
credit arrangements) that are also a member of the same Iddir. Intuitively, if this
proportion is high, then the household will share Iddir membership with a number of
other households who they know well and can rely on in times of need. The second
measure is a ‘subjective’ measure of mutual trust, based on a simple question of
41whether others in the community were trusted (on a scale of one to ﬁve, with one
equal to low). Of course, group selection – which is a prerequisite for contract
selection – is a two-way process in which households select a group, but groups can
accept or reject members. We recognize this by including all the above variables
as group level averages in the regression. Similarly, we include correlates of wealth
related to landholding – again averaged at the group level – to determine whether
higher liquidity of group members explain selection into type II contracts.
Of course, our empirical predictions are strictly speaking only valid for a given
environment and preferences of group members. To take account of this, we include
village dummies and time dummies as well as a large number of other household
and group level characteristics as explanatory variables. These include household
size, age, sex and education levels of the household head, as well as information
on the risk proﬁle of groups as measured by the average number of days lost to
illness and average number of deaths in the network in the past 5 years. Aside
from controlling for preferences, the level of education may in itself be positively
correlated with selection into type II Iddir, if these require more sophistication in
terms of the day-to-day running of the group.
Table 2 oﬀers the results from a probit analysis of the diﬀerence between the
two types of groups.7 It is striking that the only variables that are signiﬁcant and
consistent are related to social cohesion and wealth. Being born in the village, higher
levels of trust, a large proportion of the informal network relationships within the
group and ones father having been a member of the Iddir, all increase the likelihood
of selecting a type II insurance group. The variables related to wealth are all positive,
and strongly signiﬁcant. Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that
social cohesion and liquidity constraints are positively correlated with selecting into
a type II contract as predicted. The variables related to the risk proﬁle of members
are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that heterogeneity in contract choice is not driven by
these ‘demand-side’ factors.
4.2 Testing the Consumption Smoothing Beneﬁts of Contract Se-
lection
In this section we test the eﬀects of contract design under imperfect enforcement on
















7The pooled probit regression is based on the 266 of the 301 sampled households for whom all
explanatory variables are available in at least one round. This gives a total of 1106 observations in
six rounds.




Father was member of Iddir 0.093
∗∗
(0.038)
% of network born in village 0.308
∗
(0.071)
% of network that belongs to ethnic minority in village −0.172 (0.517)
% of network that belongs to religious minority in village 0.178 (0.445)
Proportion of informal network in same Iddir 0.367
∗∗
(0.045)




Second land-owning quartile† 0.123
∗∗∗
(0.003)
Third land-owning quartile† 0.280
∗∗∗
(0.000)
Fourth land-owning quartile† 0.220
∗∗∗
(0.000)
Ln age of head −0.180
∗∗∗
(0.004)
Ln of household size −0.006 (0.858)
Head has schooling†− 0.036 (0.354)
Female-headed household† 0.003 (0.944)
Number of days lost to illness in past 4 weeks 0.008 (0.648)
Average number of deaths in network in past 5 years 0.115 (0.190)
Observations 1106
Source: ERHS and Funeral Insurance Survey.
Notes: Marginal eﬀects. P-values in parentheses. Village and time dummies included, but not
reported. Robust standard errors. (†) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
∗
signiﬁcant at 10% level,
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level,
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level.
43Di
t is deﬁned as the number of deaths in household i in period t. We focus on death
shocks as an overspeciﬁcation test because they are large, idiosyncratic and to some
extent unpredictable. More importantly, the groups under study provide insurance
to cover the costs associated with the ceremonial expenditure on the funeral of the
deceased. Hence, the impact of death shocks is of immediate interest to test our





























of shocks of risk-sharing partners Ni of household i in several (possibly overlapping)
groups. Bh
t is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if group h uses primarily ex-ante
transfers and saves and zero otherwise.8 Finally, Vt is a set of village-time dummies
and Hit denotes a set of time-varying household characteristics, which are included
to capture preference shifts.
There are a number of econometric issues that have to be addressed when es-
timating (52). If there is full insurance at the village level, then the time-speciﬁc
village ﬁxed eﬀect should explain all changes in consumption growth and α0 will
be zero. If risk-sharing is conﬁned to insurance groups within the community, then
changes in household consumption are at least partly determined by changes in
average group consumption and α0 will be signiﬁcant and measures the extent to
which own consumption covaries with group consumption.
However, the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant partial eﬀect of changes in group consump-
tion on changes in own consumption does not necessarily provide evidence that Iddir
are the vehicles for insurance, because the OLS estimator mechanically ﬁts the mean
regardless of whether the data is generated by a model of risk-sharing or not (see
Suri (2005)). This is known as the reﬂection problem in the peer eﬀects literature
(see Manski (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001)). Of course, our regression does
not actually include the mean of group consumption, but the mean of group con-
sumption excluding own consumption. However, this does not solve the issue and
as pointed out by Boozer and Cacciola (2001) and Suri (2005), the magnitude of
α0 depends on the inclusion or exclusion of covariates. The authors show that α0
can be written as 1 − WSS
(N−1)BSS where WSS and BSS are the conditional within
and between sum of squares respectively. Including covariates that vary only at the
group level will bias the estimate of α0 towards zero, while covariates that explain
within group variation will make α0 closer to one.
While the identiﬁcation of α0 as a true measure of risk-sharing is not of primary
interest in our estimation, failing to estimate it correctly may present cause for
8Because of multiple group memberships, B
h
t strictly speaking measures the percentage of Iddir
of which a household is a member that use ex-ante transfers. In practice, most households only join
one type of group, so B
h
t remains a dummy even when averaged over multiple groups. Contract
type is included in levels, because a household’s membership varies at least to some extent over the
6 rounds of data.
44concern if the remaining coeﬃcients in the regression are biased as a result. We
therefore present a number of alternatives to the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator. One
solution suggested by Townsend (1994) is to simply impose α0 = 1 and subtract the












t × ˆ Bh
t )
+δ1ΔBh
t + δ2Vt + δ3ΔlnHit + εit. (53)
An alternative speciﬁcation proceeds in terms of village and group level ﬁxed ef-



















t + δ2Vt + δ3ΔlnHit + εit (54)
where Gh
t is a dummy equal to 1 if household i is a member of group h in period t.
Thirdly, we use an instrumental variable strategy. As shown in Brock and Durlauf
(2001), IV is an appropriate solution to the reﬂection problem if there is at least
one individual variable whose group average is not an element of the individual
risk-sharing equation. It is standard in the risk-sharing literature to include indi-
vidual level preference shifters in the individual equation, but to assume that group
level averages of preference shifters do not aﬀect own consumption once group con-
sumption has been controlled for (see Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994)). If we
are willing to maintain this assumption, then all the group level averages of Hi
t are
appropriate instruments for group consumption.
In addition to the reﬂection problem, we face another potentially serious prob-
lem. In the regression equation we have speciﬁed it is implicitly assumed that
network formation is exogenous. However, this is unlikely to be the case, particu-
larly in the case of funeral insurance groups, where a household can choose between
a number of groups in a particular village and this choice is unlikely to be random.
There may then be (time-varying) unobservables that may be correlated with both
own consumption and group consumption. The eﬀect that this will have on the
bias in ˆ α0 is not a priori clear. On the one hand, households may choose network
partners with whom they are connected through ethnic or geographic ties and this
proximity may imply that income and therefore consumption streams within the
network are positively correlated even in the absence of risk-sharing. This would
lead to an upward bias in ˆ α0. On the other hand, households may choose network
partners whose income streams are negatively correlated with their own in order to
45increase the beneﬁts from insurance. This would lead to a negative bias in ˆ α0 if
endogenous network formation is not adequately accounted for.
Appropriate instruments for changes in average network consumption in (52)
are required for identiﬁcation: exogenous factors that are correlated with changes
in network consumption and only aﬀect changes in own consumption via network
consumption. The number of deaths in the network, beyond the deaths experienced
by household i, is a plausible identifying instrument for network consumption. The
argument is that, given an insurance group, changes in deaths of other network mem-
bers only aﬀect own consumption via the insurance group. Own family mortality
shocks are being controlled for by the design of the risk-sharing test, and (unsurpris-
ingly) deaths within the community and network are far from perfectly correlated
with own family mortality (ρ=-.143). Network remittances to network members
from outside the network also have the potential to be reasonable instruments. As
argued in De Weerdt and Dercon (2006), the motivation for this assumption is that
outside remittances are less likely to be highly correlated among households than
other components of consumption that are wholly determined inside the village.
Overall, this suggests that we may have a priori conﬁdence in the validity of our
instrument.
A ﬁnal challenge in the estimation of (52) is that contract choice Bh
t may be
driven by unobservables also aﬀecting consumption outcomes ci
t. For example, the
theoretical model has suggested that the extent of trust and cohesion in the com-
munity or group one belongs to may aﬀect contract choice (as the better contract
requires more trust and cohesion). Trust may also aﬀect how well one is doing in
terms of consumption, ci
t. However, this particular case is not a problem: if trust
and cohesion are ﬁxed, time-invariant factors, then estimating the diﬀerence model
in (52) would purge the equation of these time-invariant factors. A more problem-
atic case would be if variables such as trust and cohesion are aﬀecting the growth in
consumption, as if there are externalities from living in high trust environments (as
suggested by social capital models). In that case, Δ(Di
t×Bh
t ) may well be correlated
with trust and cohesion and endogeneity linked to a missing variable problem would
give inconsistent estimates of β2.
In the data, we have however a large number of variables that can reﬂect the
underlying trust and cohesion in the group and community and these have been
shown to be signiﬁcant determinants of contract selection. We follow Wooldridge
(2002) and include the propensity scores from the contract selection probit regres-
sion interacted with Di
t to control for selection on observables in the risk-sharing
equation.9 The result is an estimate of β2 oﬀering the potential diﬀerential impact
9Technically, this requires that the diﬀerence between the unobserved errors of those in a type
II contract and those in a type I contract has zero mean conditional on the regressors in the
risk-sharing regression. Moreover, it requires that the diﬀerence in outcomes for those in the two
46of the contract itself, controlling for the possibly convoluted impact of general trust
and cohesion present in the group.
We can now estimate (52) using data on six villages and households with com-
plete matched data on the funeral groups they are members of. From the survey
data, it is possible to construct an estimate of monthly household consumption
for each round of the survey that will be used in the augmented risk-sharing test.
The consumption data are obtained by summing over all sources of food and non-
food consumption, deﬂated by a consumer price index using average prices in the
ﬁrst round as a base (Dercon and Krishnan (2000b)). The data are purged of
any additional expenditure, linked to exceptional items, such as health treatment
or ceremonial expenditure, so any increases in consumption directly related to the
mortality episode in the household are excluded. Total consumption is expressed
in per capita terms and in Ethiopian Birr of 1994 (1 USD = 9 Birr). Average per
capita consumption is low at about 86 Birr per month or just US$0.32 per day.
To estimate the impact of death shocks on household consumption we use an
aggregate measure of deaths that have occurred in a household, which has been
constructed from detailed ERHS household composition and mortality data. The
measure is heavily weighted to deaths of dependents (78% of recorded deaths), which
trigger the need for ceremonial expenditure. About 45% of households reported at
least one death during the survey period. On average, this corresponds to 18%
of households reporting a death in each round. Iddir only oﬀer insurance against
the funeral expenditure related to these deaths, but these can be very substantial:
average payouts amount to the equivalent of three months per adult consumption.
To control for the eﬀect of Iddir membership in the risk-sharing equation, we
need to identify the diﬀerent funeral insurance groups and their membership in
the sample. Triangulating the ERHS and FIS data, we have detailed data on 78
funeral groups and their members. As the ERHS sampled a high percentage of the
population of each village, about a quarter of the members of each group were found
to be included in the ERHS, allowing us to use an estimate of the mean consumption
level across the group; the minimum number of observations for estimating group
consumption is ﬁve.10 The contract design variable is based on the interviews with
diﬀerent contracts in the risk-sharing regression is not correlated with the variance of selecting into
a type II contract conditional on observables (see Wooldridge (2002)).
10This has been necessary for two reasons: ﬁrst of all, the fewer households that report mem-
bership and therefore information about a group, the less conﬁdent one can be that a group has
actually been identiﬁed correctly. Secondly, the fewer members of a group that are observed in the
sample, the bigger the approximation error in computing mean group consumption and therefore
the attenuation bias in estimating the network eﬀect on changes in household consumption when
insurance is incomplete. Comparison of a number of socio-economic characteristics shows that in-
cluded and excluded households are not systematically diﬀerent. Similarly, the characteristics of
insurance groups whose membership has been successfully mapped do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
groups for which matching of members has not been possible. Given the ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁ-
cation and the fact that some households are not observed in all periods, the eﬀective number of
47the Iddir leadership, and as Table 1 showed the two types are well identiﬁed in the
data.11
We now turn to a discussion of the regression results. Table 2 oﬀers the result of
the augmented risk-sharing test in (52). The model controls for a full set of interac-
tions of village and time dummies, capturing in each period total resources available
in the village, as well a full set of taste shifters, using time-varying demographic
characteristics (males and females aged 0 to 5, 6 to 15 and 16+). We present the
OLS estimation in column (1), the Townsend speciﬁcation in column (2), a speci-
ﬁcation in terms of group dummies in column (3) and the instrumented regression
using outside remittances and aggregate death shocks as identifying instruments for
group consumption in column (4).
The results are consistent with an environment of imperfect enforcement, which
is indicated by the fact that the overidentifying regressors are strongly signiﬁcant.
The estimated coeﬃcients are also remarkably similar across the four speciﬁcations
implying that estimation is unlikely to be aﬀected by the identiﬁcation problems sur-
rounding the group consumption variable. As discussed in the previous section, the
coexistence of both contract types together with the departure from ﬁrst-best risk-
sharing suggests that risk-sharing is not only constrained by individual deviations
but also by coalitional deviations.
In terms of the impact of a death shock, groups that use both ex-ante transfers
and savings clearly oﬀer superior consumption smoothing to those that do not. On
average, a household that is insured in a Type I group suﬀers a drop in consumption
of 12% following a death shock in column (4).12 If a household is insured in a type II
group, the 12% drop in consumption following a death shock is reversed completely
and consumption even increases slightly. The total eﬀect of α1 + β2 =0 .06 is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that on average type II groups achieve
full insurance.13 Based on the numerical results presented in the previous section,
this indicates that households who are members of type II groups have higher welfare
groups included in the regression is 248. We also attempt a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation which does
not require households to be observed in subsequent periods and retains 301 observations. The
results are virtually identical.
11For a very small number of groups, based on the data of the Iddir, arguments could be made that
they need to be included in another type than what the leadership had reported in the survey. Using
an alternative classiﬁcation was found to make little diﬀerence in the results and their signiﬁcance.
12The consumption aggregates used in the regression have been purged of any increases in ex-
penditure necessitated by the occurrence of a shock (such as ceremonial expenditure in case of a
funeral or hospital bills in case of illness). Therefore our insurance test will measure whether a
death shock has a lasting negative impact on consumption either because of an income short fall or
because the added expenditure at the time of a funeral makes it necessary to decrease consumption
subsequently.
13While at ﬁrst somewhat surprising, the positive (albeit insigniﬁcant) impact of a death shock
on consumption in a type II contract is consistent with our model of a contract that distributes ex-
ante transfers to agents with a low draw and occasionally overcompensates these agents to induce










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49than households insured via type I groups. Averaging over both contract types, the
impact of a death shock is 0.02, which is also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Hence, on average risk-sharing groups sustain perfect risk-sharing. However, this
masks substantial variation in the extent of insurance across contract types.
Finally, considering α0, we see that network consumption and the group dummies
are strongly signiﬁcant in column (1),(3) and (4) after controlling for period-speciﬁc
village eﬀects. This suggests that risk-sharing occurs via the network and not just
the village. The negative sign in the OLS regression is possible, if insurance is
partial and the covariance between group resources and village resources is large.
Given that village level resources vary between groups but not within groups, we
expect this to reduce α0 =1− WSS
(N−1)BSS and a stepwise regression approach reveals
that the negative coeﬃcient is indeed driven by the inclusion of the village level
ﬁxed eﬀect. The coeﬃcient on group consumption is large, signiﬁcant and positive
in the IV-regression. This is consistent with full insurance of ceremonial expendi-
ture via Iddir in the sense that the added expenditure at the time of a funeral does
not require households to subsequently cut back on consumption. The ﬁrst stage
regression is well behaved. The identifying instruments are overall signiﬁcant and
network remittances are positively correlated with network consumption and the
diagnostics reported in Table 4 suggest that we can have some conﬁdence in the in-
struments used. The Cragg-Donald test of underidentiﬁcation is strongly rejected,
the Kleibergen-Paap weak identiﬁcation statistic exceeds the critical values com-
puted by Stock and Yogo (2002) and the Hansen statistic suggests that the overall
set of instruments is exogenous.14
So far, our analysis points to the importance of insurance groups in sharing
risk related to funeral expenditures. Speciﬁcally, the results suggest that funeral
expenditure is insured well enough that households do not suﬀer any lasting negative
impact following a death, i.e. they do not ﬁnd it necessary to decrease consumption
subsequently. Moreover, there is evidence that groups carefully design contracts
to overcome the impediments of imperfect enforcement and threats of coalitional
deviations. In particular, groups that combine ex-ante transfers and savings seem
to be remarkably successful at approximating full insurance. Given this superiority,
it is surprising that not all groups use ex-ante transfers and accumulate savings.
However, as we have shown in the modelling section, suﬃcient trust among group
members is an important prerequisite for such an organizational structure, and
our analysis in the previous section has demonstrated that the level of trust is
signiﬁcantly higher among members of Type II groups than members of Type I
groups. Of course, it is also possible that this higher level of trust aﬀects not just
contract choice, but also how well shocks are insured once a group has decided on a
14Detailed ﬁrst-stage results are available from the authors on request.
50particular institutional set up. If this is the case and we fail to control for the eﬀect
of trust and cohesion, then the coeﬃcient on the contract variable may suﬀer from
omitted variable bias. We investigate this in Table 4, where we add the propensity
score from the ﬁrst-stage contract selection regression both in levels and interacted
with the death shock to the instrumented risk-sharing regression (column (4) in
Table 3) in order to control for any bias that arises from selection on observables.15
Column (1) of the table reports how inclusion of the propensity score aﬀects the
predicted average impact of a death shock in a type II contract. The ﬁrst thing to
note is that the predicted eﬀect of a death shock in a type I contract remains negative
and signiﬁcant, while the interaction of the death shock variable with the contract
dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. A death shock in a type I group is predicted
to result in a 12% drop in consumption, which is reasonably close to the range of
values reported in Table 3. The interaction of the propensity score with the death
shock variable is negative and signiﬁcant indicating that selection on observables
is important. However, the total impact of a death shock in a type II contract
is predicted to be −0.12 + 0.31 − 0.26 × (E(propensity score|contract type=II) −
E(propensity score|contract type=I)) = 0.08, which is virtually the same as in Table
3 and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In column (2), we investigate an alternative speciﬁcation in which the variables
relating to social cohesion from the contract selection regression are included directly
in the regression instead of using the propensity score as a summary measure. The
results from the two speciﬁcations are more or less identical. The impact of a death
shock in a type I contract is -.167, while the impact of a death shock in a type II
contract is predicted to be 0.07, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
coeﬃcients on the interaction of the average trust in the network and a household’s
death shock and the interaction of proportion of a household’s informal network
and the death shock are the only ones to be signiﬁcant but cancel each other out in
magnitude. Finally, the eﬀect of (instrumented) changes in group consumption is
large and signiﬁcant for both speciﬁcations in Table 4. Taken together, these results
can give us some conﬁdence that the coeﬃcient on the contract variable does indeed
measure the impact of the organizational structure of the Iddir itself rather than
merely the eﬀect of a group’s membership composition.
15Following the method in Wooldridge (2002), the propensity score is estimated using all the
variables in Table 2 as well as the explanatory variables in (52). The eﬀects of the variables
from the contract selection regression are virtually unchanged, while exogenous regressors from
the regression in (52) mostly fail to be signiﬁcant in this ’ﬁrst-stage’ regression. The propensity
score variable is demeaned as follows: propensity score−E(propensity score|contract type=I). This
ensures that the coeﬃcient on the death shock measures the impact of a shock in a type I group.
51Table 4: Testing the welfare eﬀects of contract selection controlling for selection
(1) (2)
(FD-IV) (FD-IV)
Δln consumption Δln consumption










Δ contract -0.688 -0.858
∗∗
(0.156) (0.021)





Δ propensity score 0.422
(0.392)
Δ (death × prop. score) -0.260
(0.132)
Δ (death × netw. trust) -0.205
∗∗
(0.035)
Δ (death × % of netw. born in village) -0.002
(0.991)
Δ (contract × % of netw. minority religion) 0.097
(0.688)
Δ (death × % of netw. minority religion) -0.216
(0.364)
Δ (death × % of informal netw. in Iddir) 0.401
∗∗
(0.042)
Number of households 208 248
F-statistic of joint signiﬁcance 7.95 8.29
p-value of Hansen J-statistic 0.234 0.530
Source: ERHS and Funeral Insurance Survey.
Notes: Household ﬁxed eﬀects. Propensity scores derived from contract selection regression in Table
2. P-values in parentheses. Village-time dummies and individual preference shifts included, but
not reported. Robust standard errors.
∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,
∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level,
∗∗∗
signiﬁcant at 1% level.
525 Conclusion
This paper has explored theoretically and empirically contract choice in funeral
insurance groups and its consequences for welfare. We focused on two types of
contracts found in rural Ethiopia: one with considerable savings at the level of
the group and regular payments unrelated to shocks, and one without savings and
payments to its members after they experienced a mortality shock. Consistent with
theoretical predictions and simulation results, we found that both contracts co-
exist in the same villages and that contract choice is related to social cohesion. In
general, we found evidence that on average death shocks are well insured but that
there are catastrophic shocks, for which insurance is incomplete. Furthermore, we
could conﬁrm that groups with contracts including group savings resulted in welfare
gains in the form of higher consumption smoothing among the members of groups
engaging in this type of contract, compared to those without group savings and
only ex-post payments. Despite this heterogeneity, our results suggest nevertheless
that funeral associations in rural Ethiopia are remarkably successful in providing
insurance against death shocks.
In a broader context, our paper also contributes to the extensive and continu-
ously growing literature on social capital and its welfare impacts. While there is no
unique deﬁnition of social capital, the instrumental view of social capital holds that
in and of itself it is a neutral force (see Coleman (1988)). That is, it has no intrinsic
beneﬁts unless it is put to some productive use. The results in this paper mirror
this view. While high levels of trust and reciprocity – which are suitable proxies
for social capital according to Putnam (2000) – are a necessary prerequisite for the
enforcement of more sophisticated contractual arrangements, they are neither suﬃ-
cient nor are they substitutes for the beneﬁts derive from more formalized insurance
provision. In this respect, the paper also sheds some light on the important question
of how social capital can be turned into a ”resource for action” in practice (Coleman
(1988)).
Taking a longer term view, there are even more fundamental reasons, why semi-
formal insurance groups deserve our attention. While some may argue that the
prevalence of these institutions in developing countries signiﬁes economic backward-
ness, and that they will rightfully become obsolete if growth takes oﬀ, there is an
alternative view which posits that these institutions are an integral part of a coun-
try’s growth strategy especially in terms of achieving ﬁnancial proliferation. After
all, there are numerous examples of humble mutual and friendly societies in devel-
oped economies that have turned into large and sophisticated ﬁnancial institutions
over the last century.16 This provides some hope that informal ﬁnancial institutions
16The German Raiﬀeisen cooperatives started as localized self-help organizations in the 19th
century and today have the densest network of bank branches in Germany. Similarly, friendly
53can be stepping stones – rather than stumbling blocks – on the path to economic
development.
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